The principal-agent of the ownership of state-owned natural resource assets is essentially a matter of authority division between central and local governments. From the perspective of state governance, the central-local division principle in the governance of state-owned natural resource assets is analyzed and the choice logic of central centralization and local decentralization is revealed. The governance changes of state-owned agricultural land are used as an example to verify the authority division and dynamic adjustment process between the central and local governments in the management of reclamation areas. It is found that from the three dimensions of whether the governance of people is separated, whether the governance of officials is separated, and whether the governance of affairs is strategically needed, the governance of state-owned natural resource assets can be divided into centralized direct management, central-local co-management, and local territorialized management; the governance mode of state-owned natural resource assets will be dynamically adjusted with the change of dimensions. The central-local division lies in trade-off between efficiency and risk by the central government. The study will enhance the expansion of state governance theory in the field of natural resources, and has important theoretical and practical significance for the formation of the central-local division theory for the governance of state-owned natural resource assets and the realization of principal-agent mechanism of the ownership.

The implementation of the principal-agent mechanism in the management of natural resource assets owned by the whole people is an exploratory proposition to realize the effective protection and efficient utilization of natural resource assets. Based on the theory of incomplete contract and the theory of rent dissipation, aiming at the orderly transfer of property rights and the dissipation of rent value reduction, the power mutation logic of the transformation of property rights from "right" to "power" must be deconstructed. It is found through the study that the property rights of natural resource assets have been partially transferred under the guidance of Marx's property rights theory, and then developed into large-scale operation in the framework of dual ownership, while the mutation of power and the transfer of property rights have caused the exercise dilemma represented by the expansion of residual control rights and the structural absence of supervision. It is believed that the tension between government powers and responsibilities should be strengthened to inhibit the expansion of control rights, contributing to the orderly return of property rights from ownership by the whole people to individual operation. Meanwhile, the independence of digital comprehensive supervision must be heightened, and the exercise mode of "universal ownership-legal entrustment-hierarchical agency-partial property rights transfer-comprehensive supervision" could be implemented, avoiding the non-rational rent dissipation of natural resource assets. In this model, there are three ways to achieve. Firstly, control decomposition should build a hierarchical downward mechanism for the residual control rights of natural resource assets, enhance the arrangement of control rights at the same level for the natural resource assets utilization and supervision, and establish a legal and regulatory system with clear powers and responsibilities. Secondly, people related to property right must reduce cross of attributes, conduct scale operation and cut down on property rights conflicts, lowering down the transaction costs and rental value dissipation caused by property rights conflicts among operators. Thirdly, comprehensive oversight is supposed to deepen the construction of digital standardization and expand the space for standardization supervision, and improve the independence of "digital supervision" by utilizing digital government opportunities, strengthening the incentive compatibility mechanism of natural resource asset supervision. More importantly, digital regulation is not only an extension of internal supervision, but the decentralization of regulatory power which is to make the regulatory process and results transparent and the bottom line of ecological protection visible, gradually improving its independence and making it become a "third party supervision" carrier. This is to allow the masses, the media, and group organizations to exercise their supervisory power through the carrier of "digital supervision", and resort to laws and regulations for unreasonable behaviors or phenomena. At the same time, the roles of "manager" and "referee" of the government can be separated.

This article examines the progress of the reform of the property rights system for natural resources assets since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. It explores the policy orientation of the reform in response to the needs of China's modernization and future reform from the perspective of national governance structure. The research shows that the reform has optimized the arrangement of natural resource asset property rights and improved the system of compensated use and hierarchical exercise of ownership. However, the goal of achieving a Chinese-style modernization raises new requirements for the reform. Future reforms of the property rights system for natural resources assets should meet the demands for marketization, rule of law, equality, matching of ownership, rights, and responsibilities, as well as matching of property arrangements and exercise arrangements. To this end, future reforms should be based on the establishment of an equal, complete, and orderly natural resource asset property rights arrangement in urban and rural areas. They should focus on building a unified large market, improving the rule of law system for property rights, establishing a system of entrusted agency, and promoting the integration of urban and rural development. These measures will enhance the exercise mechanism of natural resource asset property rights and facilitate the effective realization of these rights and functions.

Over the last few decades, market demand has arisen for natural resources, along with conflicts over resource property rights, creating a need for institutional innovation for resource property rights and more flexible ways of governance. Nonetheless, there is yet no consensus on how to create such a flexible natural resources property rights system that aligns with appropriate governance models. An integrated system of property rights for natural resources is crucial to establish an institutional basis for the integrated protection and flexible governance of natural resources, such as mountains, rivers, forests, farmland, lakes, rangelands, and deserts. Through a theoretical analysis and case studies, this paper examines the existing theoretical puzzles and practical challenges in managing natural resources and the reasons behind. We suggest that natural resources vary considerably and in the meantime are interdependent and interconnected, and integrated natural resource management should consider the entirety of the ecosystem, the complexity and dynamic of the social-ecological system, and the uncertainty of resource issues. Therefore, we develop a framework for natural resource management that decouples property rights from the "Resource System-Resource Service" perspective, allowing property rights innovations to fit with ecological characteristics and local-specific social-economic circumstances. Moreover, the framework concentrates on matching both property rights and governance structures. To illustrate, we examine three practical cases, including self-organized grazing quota governance in pastoral areas, trans-provincial water resource management, and market-based systematic natural resource management in forestry areas. These cases demonstrated that the framework provides a theoretical forum for innovation of natural resource property rights and governance structures for governing various types of resources. It allows for flexible responses to resource variations and dynamics, while serving practical needs and encouraging governance innovation in diverse settings.