自然资源学报 ›› 2019, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (6): 1232-1244.doi: 10.31497/zrzyxb.20190609

• 资源生态 • 上一篇    下一篇

博弈视角下跨界河流水资源保护协作机制——以太湖流域太浦河为例

杨梦杰1,2(), 杨凯1,2(), 李根1,2, 牛小丹1,2   

  1. 1. 华东师范大学生态与环境科学学院,上海城市化生态过程和生态恢复重点实验室,上海 200241
    2. 上海污染控制与生态安全研究院,上海 200092
  • 收稿日期:2018-09-01 修回日期:2019-03-01 出版日期:2019-06-20 发布日期:2019-06-20
  • 作者简介:

    作者简介:杨梦杰(1995- ),男,安徽阜阳人,硕士,主要从事流域水资源管理研究。E-mail: ymj0717@163.com

  • 基金资助:
    水体污染控制与治理科技重大专项(2017ZX07207003-01)

The cooperation mechanism of water resources protection in trans-boundary river based on game theory: A case study of the Taipu River in the Taihu Lake Basin

Meng-jie YANG1,2(), Kai YANG1,2, Gen LI1,2, Xiao-dan NIU1,2   

  1. 1. School of Ecological and Environmental Sciences, Shanghai Key Lab for Urban Ecological Processes and Eco-Restoration, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200241, China
    2. Shanghai Institute of Pollution Control and Ecological Security, Shanghai 200092, China
  • Received:2018-09-01 Revised:2019-03-01 Online:2019-06-20 Published:2019-06-20

摘要:

跨界河流水资源保护利益协调问题是流域水资源管理的难点。以太湖流域典型跨界河流太浦河为例,对比分析上下游水资源保护利益诉求,基于博弈理论,引入外部驱动(流域机构介入、激励约束政策)与内部均衡(生态补偿、断面水质考核)四种协调手段,探讨均衡太浦河上下游利益矛盾、激励上下游实现合作保护的协作机制。结果表明:(1)在引入协调手段的博弈模型中,实现了博弈系统向协作策略(达标,补偿)演化。(2)基于博弈分析结果,协作策略(达标,补偿)的实现与激励约束力度、补偿金额、水权、上游保护成本与效益等因素密切相关。(3)外部驱动机制有利于协调上下游河流功能定位需求差异,并调动上下游加强协作保护的积极性与主动性;内部均衡机制有利于弥补上游水权、产业发展等利益损失,并倒逼太浦河水质达标、保障下游取水安全。(4)构建的太浦河水资源保护协作机制,可为加快推进长三角一体化协同发展,建设流域“清水走廊”提供理论与决策支持参考。

关键词: 水资源保护, 协作机制, 博弈分析, 跨界河流, 太浦河

Abstract:

The coordination of interests among stakeholders in water resources management for trans-boundary rivers remains to be a challenge. Taking the Taipu River, a typical trans-boundary river in the Taihu Lake Basin, as an example, this paper analyzed the interest demands of stakeholders for water resources protection in the upstream and downstream regions of the Taipu River. Based on the game theory, this paper introduced both external driving forces (Watershed Agency Intervention and Incentive and Restraint Policies) and internal equilibrium measures (Ecological Compensation and Sectional Water Quality Assessment) to explore a cooperation mechanism that can mitigate the conflicts and encourage cooperation between the upstream and downstream regions. The results show that: (1) The game cooperative strategy (Reaching Standard, Compensation) is realized in the game model with the coordination methods. (2) Based on the results of game analysis, the realization of the game strategy (Reaching Standard, Compensation) is closely related to the strength of incentives and constraints, the amount of compensation, water rights, upstream protection costs and benefits. (3) The external driving forces can help to coordinate the function orientation difference of upstream and downstream demands of the Taipu River, and to create the enthusiasm and initiative of protection cooperation of the upstream and downstream regions. The internal equilibrium measures can compensate for the loss of upstream water rights and industrial development interests, making the water quality of the Taipu River to meet the safety standard of the downstream water intake. (4) The coordination mechanism of the water resources protection for the Taipu River was constructed, which provides theoretical and decision-making support to accelerate the coordinated development of the Yangtze River Delta and establish a Clean Water Corridor in the Taihu Lake Basin.

Key words: water resources protection, cooperation mechanism, game analysis, trans-boundary river, Taipu River