自然资源学报

自然资源学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (4): 549-559.doi: 10.11849/zrzyxb.2015.04.002

• 资源利用与管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

跨界流域污染防治:基于合作博弈的视角

石广明1, 王金南2, 董战峰2, 张永亮3   

  1. 1. 湖南省环境保护科学研究院环境规划与政策研究所, 长沙410006;
    2. 环境保护部环境规划院, 环境保护部环境规划院国家环境保护环境规划与政策模拟重点实验室, 北京100012;
    3. 环境保护部环境与经济政策研究中心, 北京100029
  • 收稿日期:2014-03-01 修回日期:2014-08-27 出版日期:2015-04-20 发布日期:2015-04-16
  • 通讯作者: 王金南(1963- ),男,浙江武义人,博士,研究员,博士生导师,研究方向为环境经济与管理.E-mail:wangjn@caep.org.cn E-mail:wangjn@caep.org.cn
  • 作者简介:石广明(1983- ),男,贵州贵阳人,博士,助理研究员,研究方向为环境经济与管理.Email:guangming0424@126.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学青年基金项目(41301638)

Pollution Prevention for TransboundaryWatershed: Perspective from Cooperative Game Theory

SHI Guang-ming1, WANG Jin-nan2, DONG Zhan-feng2, ZHANG Yong-liang3   

  1. 1. Hunan Research Academy of Environmental Science, Institute of Environmental Planning and Policy, Changsha 410006, China;
    2. Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning, State Environment Protecting Key Laboratory of Environmental Planning and Policy Simulation, Beijing 100012, China;
    3. Policy Research Center for Enrironment and Economy, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Beijing 100029, China
  • Received:2014-03-01 Revised:2014-08-27 Online:2015-04-20 Published:2015-04-16

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被引次数

7

摘要：

随着经济的高速发展,跨界流域污染问题在我国越发严重起来.从国外解决跨界流域污染的实践经验来看,各个地区采取合作治理污染物的方式防治跨界流域污染,是解决跨界流域污染问题比较经济可行的方式.从国内外众多研究来看,现有研究仅限于利用博弈理论分析完全合作情况下的收益分配问题,并没有对收益分配后,各合作者所形成的合作是否稳定、收益分配是否公平进行讨论与深入分析.论文以此为切入点,利用跨界流域污染合作治理思路,以河南省贾鲁河流域的4 个地区为实证研究对象进行了实证分析.从博弈理论的角度详细地分析了各个地区进行合作防治跨界流域污染的思路、方式,并对各个地区之间进行合作治理污染物时的稳定性进行了讨论.研究结果显示,在进行合作治理污染物时,不同地区的边际污染物减排成本差异是各个地区能否进行合作防治跨界流域污染的关键,并且不同的收益/成本分担机制对不同地区长期、稳定地开展合作治理污染物也有较大的影响.

关键词: 跨界流域污染, 合作稳定性, 污染防治, 合作博弈

Abstract:

With the rapid economic increase, the transboundary watershed pollution has become very seriously. From the practical experience of solving this problem in foreign countries, the control of pollutants emission by cooperation of different regions is an economic way to solve the problem. According to the current international and domestic researches, most studies were limited to analyze the benefit allocation in fully cooperative coalition while ignored the acceptability and stabilization of the benefit allocation of the cooperative groups. Based on this shortage, this paper established a cooperative game model of solving the transboundary watershed pollution problem. We used this model to analyze the Jialu River watershed whose area includes the regions of Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, Xuchang and Luohe. From the perspective of game theory, we used four different benefit allocation schemes to analyze the possibility and stabilization in different cooperative groups for these regions. The results showed that the benefit allocations of Shapley value and SCRB (Separable Cost Remaining Benefit) method have better acceptability and stabilization than the rest of methods. If we use the Shapley value to allocated benefits which formed in fully cooperative coalition, Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, Xuchang and Luohe can acquire benefit about 391.22×104, 100.55×104, 76.3×104 and 269.35×104 yuan, respectively. And if we use the SCRB method to allocate that benefits, then Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, Xuchang and Luohe can acquire benefit about 400.94×104, 96.06×104, 74.35×104 and 266.06×104 yuan, respectively. Despite the higher likelihood of Shapley value and SCRB method to be accepted by these regions, the stabilizations of the two methods were not good enough. The benefit allocation result of Shapley value showed that the stabilization of Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, Xuchang and Luohe was 0.95, 0.82, 0.86 and 0.88, respectively. Meanwhile, the result of SCRB method was that the stabilization of Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, Xuchang and Luohe was 0.9, 0.9, 0.9 and 0.9, respectively. The two results indicated that the voluntary negotiation on forming fully cooperative coalition in these study regions was not sustainable.

Key words: pollution prevention, cooperative stabilization, transboundary watershed pollution, cooperative game

中图分类号: 

  • X321