自然资源学报

自然资源学报 ›› 2014, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (1): 39-45.doi: 10.11849/zrzyxb.2014.01.004

• 资源经济 • 上一篇    下一篇

流域水资源保护补偿博弈分析及蚁群算法解

解建仓1, 席保军1, 黄俊铭1,2   

  1. 1. 西安理工大学教育部西北水资源与环境生态重点实验室, 西安 710048;
    2. 福建省环境保护厅, 福州 350001
  • 收稿日期:2012-08-23 修回日期:2013-05-21 出版日期:2014-01-20 发布日期:2014-01-09
  • 作者简介:解建仓（1963- ），男，陕西省眉县人，教授，博士生导师，主要研究区域经济与水资源管理、水资源系统工程。E-mail：847828497@qq.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（51109177，51209170）；教育部人文社科研究项目（10XJCZH002）；陕西省科学技术研究发展计划(2012JQ5014)；西安理工大学博士启动基金（118-211103）

Game Model for River Basin Water Resources Protection Compensation Solved by Ant Colony Algorithm

XIE Jian-cang1, XI Bao-jun1, HUANG Jun-ming1,2   

  1. 1. Northwest Key Laboratory of Water Resources and Environment Ecology, Ministry of Education. Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710048, China;
    2. Fujian Provincial Department of Environmental Protection, Fuzhou 350001, China
  • Received:2012-08-23 Revised:2013-05-21 Online:2014-01-20 Published:2014-01-09

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被引次数

10 | 4

摘要： 协调好流域上下游间的收益问题，使上下游和谐发展，实现全流域收益最优，是目前我国流域水资源保护补偿研究和实践中的重点。论文从博弈论的角度研究流域水资源保护补偿中上下游间的行为和收益问题，建立了行政调节的流域水资源保护补偿博弈模型，利用蚁群算法实现模型最优求解。将该模型应用于晋江流域，结果表明：当上游的安溪县、德化县、永春县以及南安市（上游部分）提供给下游的水量分别为0.87×108、0.75×108、0.85×108和0.76×108 m3时，分别可获得0.925×108、0.673×108、0.949×108和1.019×108元的经济补偿，同时下游地区获得48.765×108元的效益，此时流域总收益最大。上游地区合理供水可大幅提升全流域的收益，下游给上游合理补偿能够协调上下游关系，促进上下游的和谐发展。

关键词: 水资源保护, 博弈论, 补偿机制, 蚁群算法

Abstract: How to coordinate the interests between basin upstream and basin downstream and achieve harmonious development between basin upstream and basin downstream and maximize the interests of the entire river basin is the principal contradiction in river basin water resources compensation in China. In order to study the protection compensation mechanism of river basin water resources, this paper formulates scientific compensation standard of water protection and promotes reasonable protection and utilization of the river basin water resources. It studies the behavior and interests of the basin upstream and downstream from the perspective of the game theory, then puts forward a basin water resources protection compensation game model of administrative regulation, which is solved optimally by the Ant Colony Algorithm. The model is applied to the Jinjiang River Basin, the results show that when the upstream of Anxi, Dehua, Yongchun and Nan'an (the upper part) provides water to the downstream is 0.87×108m3, 0.75×108m3, 0.85×108m3 and 0.76×108 m3, respectively, it can obtain 0.925×108 yuan, 0.673×108 yuan, 0.949×108 yuan and 1.019× 108 yuan economic compensation, at the same time, the downstream area receives 48.765× 108 yuan benefits, the total benefit in the basin reaches the maximum. A reasonable water supply from the upstream region can significantly improve the interests of the whole basin, the downstream provides reasonable compensation funds for the upstream can make the relationship between upstream and downstream coordinated, narrow the economic and social development gap between the upstream and downstream and promote the harmonious development between the upstream and the downstream. Meanwhile, using Ant Colony Algorithm to solve the model is easy to form computer languages, which brings high computing speed, high efficiency, good convergence performance and the easy way to find the global optimal solution. Through the establishment of administrative regulation game model, the scientific computing of the amount of water transferred and the compensation standard, this paper realizes the benign interaction of water protection among the upstream and downstream, water supply area and intake area. It is of great importance and value to the establishment of protection mechanism of river basin water resources and the promotion of the unified management of river basin water resources.

Key words: water resources protection, game theory, compensation mechanism, ant colony algorithm

中图分类号: 

  • TV213.4